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Book Reviews
Michael D. Gibson, research associate at the Division of the State Historical
Society, is the new book review editor for The Annals. Those wishing to re-
view works of significant historical scholarship on Iowa and the surrounding
Midwest, state and local histoty, the American frontier, the Civil War, and
general related subjects should send enquiries to Mr. Gibson at the Division
of the State Historical Society, 402 Iowa Avenue, Iowa City, Iowa 52240.
Please enclose a short resume and description of areas of interest.
Two Review Essays
I: THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN POLICY
Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy, edited by William P.
Bundy. New York: A Council on Foreign Relations Book. New York Uni-
versity Press, 1977. pp. xi, 251.
Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45,
by Michael S. Sherry. New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1977. pp. X, 238 Notes. $12.50.
The end of the prolonged and tragic U.S. involvement in Vietnam, fol-
lowed by the Bicentennial, caused many Americans to wonder about their
nation's role in world affairs. Both books under review reflect this tendency.
Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy consists of seven essays that
originally appeared in the influential periodical Foreign Affairs, a publica-
tion of the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations. The essays are aimed
primarily at a non-academic audience of government officials and private
citizens who are concerned with foreign policy. Michael Sherry's monograph
is a revision of his doctoral dissertation and will be read with interest mainly
by scholars.
The essays in Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy cover long
time spans and are written by individuals who are not specialists in American
diplomatic history. While this means the authors do not have established
positions to defend, it also means they are not always abreast of current liter-
ature. A theme that appears in many of the essays involves the complex inter-
relationship of idealism and realism that has existed in our nation's dealings
with others. From the time of independence, some Americans wished to
avoid contact with European balance-of-power politics, correctly fearing that
involvement could endanger the country. This tendency was counterbalanced
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by a realistic appraisal that for a number of reasons, largely related to com-
mercial considerations, the United States could not become a hermit nation.
Furthermore, the desire to remain aloof always applied to Europe and not to
the Western Hemisphere or to the Pacific Ocean region, as Latin Americans
and Asians often have discovered to their regret. In addition, the desire to re-
ject balance-of-power politics at times manifested itself as a drive to remake
the world in America's image.
Focusing on U.S. relations with Europe, the authors of the first three arti-
cles discuss a number of related issues. The first concerns the ambivalent
American attitude to the balance of power. According to Felix Gilbert, the
Founding Fathers' desire to avoid power politics stemmed from a wide ac-
ceptance of bourgeois values and the influence of European radicals. Both
Gilbert and Gordon Craig demonstrate, however, that the leaders of the new
nation found it impossible to remain aloof from European affairs. Craig
shows how the Founding Fathers shrewdly took advantage of shifts in the
European balance to enhance U.S. interests. Second, the authors agree that
for nearly a century after the Napoleonic Wars, the European balance
worked to America's advantage. No longer threatened by events on the other
side of the Atlantic, Americans could turn their attention to building an in-
dustrial society and expanding across the North American continent. In his
essay on U.S.-British relations, Alastair Buchan correctly argues that the
British repeatedly gave way to America because they had greater interests in
other parts of the world. Third, the authors believe that the situation
changed dramatically during Woodrow Wilson's administration when the
U.S. embarked on an idealistic crusade to make the world safe for democracy
and, failing in this, turned to isolation in the 1930s. The same sense of ideal-
ism inhibited Franklin Roosevelt in his handling of World War II diplomacy.
Only with the Cold War did America accept the need to participate in power
politics, a task it occasionally pursued with excessive vigor.
lohn Patón Davies also explores the moralism/real ism theme in his
lengthy account of America's relations with East Asia. Davies is most effec-
tive when describing the rise of Asian nationalism and how American
attempts to control this process repeatedly failed. He accuses U.S. officials of
being too moralistic in their approach to China and Japan during the 1930s
and 1940s. The moralistic policy, he argues, helped produce a vacuum that
communist groups filled. Following the "loss" of China, American moralism
turned sour and the country was ready to rely on military force to prevent the
extension of communist power. Moreover, Americans continually misinter-
preted Asian nationalism as communism. The result was Vietnam.
The central challenge to contemporary American diplomacy has been the
rise of the communist world, a process begun with the Bolshevik Revolution.
In an uneven essay, George F. Kennan traces US-Soviet relations from 1917-
76. As he has done elsewhere, Kennan argues that the Soviets were influ-
enced by their ideological opposition to the capitalist world. This made them
nearly impossible to deal with over the 1920-45 period. During World War
II, President Roosevelt unwisely encouraged Americans to believe that coop-
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eration with Stalinist Russia was possible. When the barbaric side of the
Soviets surfaced, Americans experienced the sensation of unrequited love,
which soon gave way to unreasonable hatred: Stalin seemed worse than
Hitler, and extremism gained the upper hand. In the most informative part of
the essay, Kennan contends that America's reliance on a militarized foreign
policy forced the Soviets to escalate their armaments program. It also
blinded Americans to changes occurring within the Soviet Union and caused
them to miss opportunities to moderate the Cold War. Presently there exists
a real prospect for an arms agreement if U.S. politicans can control the mili-
tary-industrial complex and right-wing anti-communists.
The region of the world in which the United States has been most free to
act unilaterally is Latin America. As Abraham Lowenthal demonstrates, US
hemispheric dominance reached its zenith in the twenty years following
World War II. Since that time, U.S. power has ebbed, a process Lowenthal
would like to see continue. He counsels Americans to avoid intervention, to
realize that some parts of South America are more important than others,
and to accept the fact that they cannot solve all the hemisphere's ills.
Unfortunately one of the most important facets of foreign policy, that
dealing with economic issues, is the most poorly handled. What's worse,
Charles Kindleberger is capable of doing an excellent job, as he has done on
other occasions. Instead of an enlightening essay, Kindleberger presents a
superficial overview for the 200-year period. He is incorrect on several minor
facts which makes the reader wonder if anyone so consistently wrong on de-
tails can be correct on major points. The author discusses current inter-
national difficulties and concludes that the US will have to become the leader
of the world economy inspite of its own mounting problems. He remains
committed to the vision of an international economy based on the market sys-
tem even though increasing numbers of countries are rejecting what essen-
tially is an updated 19th-century view.
Taken together, the essays provide an interesting introduction to Ameri-
can foreign policy since independence. Nonetheless, there are some short-
comings. As several authors have shown, America's opposition to balance-
of-power politics has not kept officials from taking advantage of favorable
shifts. A strong sense of idealism, therefore, has not interfered with a real-
istic analysis of possibilities for national aggrandizement. A more trouble-
some point is that the authors have relied on an outdated interpretation of
Woodrow Wilson. Since the publication of N. Gordon Levin Jr.'s Woodrow
Wilson and World Politics, most academics have realized that Wilson was a
complex person who combined realism and idealism: for Wilson, the two
were inseparable. America's entrance into World War I was never solely an
idealistic crusade. Furthermore, it is seriously misleading to imply that dis-
illusioned Wilsonians were responsible for the isolationism of the 1930s. Con-
servatives who were opposed to New Deal liberalism and worried more about
communism than facism provided the backbone of the isolationist move-
ment. The cold-war crusade was caused in part by the same anti-liberal ele-
ments.
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There are three main reasons why America has faced mounting foreign
policy difficulties since World War I and none of them involve excessive
moralism. One has been the rapidly changing international system caused by
two world wars, the Russian and Chinese revolutions, the Great Depression,
the emergence of fascism, and the rise of the non-western world. Davies,
Kennan, and Lowenthal touch on aspects of these issues but do not empha-
size them adequately. The second has been the way in which the policymak-
ing elite has defined what America's international interests are, what type of
world system would protect these interests, and which societies threatened
the US world view. None of the authors has come to grips with this point. The
third has been the ability of pressure groups and domestic political consider-
ations to influence policy. Kennan and Kindleberger pay some attention to
these questions but understate their importance.
Michael Sherry does focus on domestic groups, especially those Army
officers who planned for the post-World War II period. Troubled by the US
intervention in Vietnam, he hopes to shed light on the origins of the Cold
War, the militarization of foreign policy, and the hold which the Munich
analogy has had on Americans. Although others have analyzed facets of mili-
tary postwar planning, he is the first to concentrate on the Army.
Those who worry about excessive military influence on planning may be
surprised to learn that this was not the case during 1941-45. In fact. General
George Marshall, Army chief of staff and supreme military conimander, was
rather cautious. Instead of large budgets, he anticipated that the interwar
pattern of Congressional parsimoniousness and public apathy would return.
His two goals were the development of a smooth demobilization program that
would return soldiers quickly to civilian life, and the implementation of a
Universal Military Training (UMT) program that would provide a large pool
of slightly trained citizen-soldiers. At no time did he, nor virtually anyone
else, expect that the infiated military budgets that have existed since 1950
would occur. Moreover, Marshall was careful to defer to civilian leadership
and refused to rely on scare tactics to obtain greater appropriations.
As they pondered the future, military planners operated under a number
of assumptions. They believed there would be another war caused by an
aggressor, though nobody knew who it would be. Assuming the war would
begin with a surprise attack, they wanted America to be able to mobilize
quickly. Finally most thought that air power would be the decisive weapon.
The policy they recommended was UMT. This would allow the military to
grow rapidly. By symbolizing national determination, it would tend to deter
aggressors. Interestingly, military officers were not noticeably anti-Soviet,
with Marshall repeatedly stressing the importance of good relations.
Obviously something happened to undermine this approach. The sudden
end of the war led to greater than anticipated pressures for demobilization:
the military's plan faltered under the strain. Along >yith other factors, public
annoyance with demobilization doomed UMT. Shortly after the fighting was
over, thus, there were no plans for postwar defense. The outlines of a new
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consensus quickly took shape. Following the collapse of the UMT campaign,
Navy and Air Corps leaders pressed ahead with the more ambitious plans
they favored. Moreover, scientists who had benefited from wartime spending
were reluctant to see this source of funds dry up. Capitalizing on the public's
appreciation for the vast array of technologically advanced weapons that
helped shorten the war, they lobbied for larger appropriations.
The key element in forming the new consensus was the deterioration in
relations with the Soviet Union, particularly the way national leaders por-
trayed the issues. Civilian, not military, officials assumed the initiative in
advocating a hard line against Russia; and this provided an opportunity for
the more aggressive wing of the military to press for increased spending. By
the end of 1945, Marshall was no longer chief of staff, and his replacement,
Dwight Eisenhower, was arguing that America needed an impressive military
machine to deter aggression and prevent a surprise attack. The new defense
plans assumed that a future war would be an all-out one between the big
powers. Therefore, they did not provide guidelines for responding to difficul-
ties in the newly emerging areas of the globe. Also there was a cruel paradox
created by relying on nuclear power as a deterrent: the sheer power of the
weapons caused them to lose credibility. Few wished to save the world by de-
stroying it.
For the most part, Sherry has done a commendable job: the book reads
well, is fully documented, and the arguments make sense. Along with Two
Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy, it provides a vivid demonstra-
tion of the way unanticipated occurrences infiuence events, a point all the
authors could emphasize more fully. Nobody wanted the US to become a
global policeman that spent a large percentage of its Gross National Product
for military purposes. Yet this happened because of the way foreign and
domestic affairs intertwined and unfolded. The point is not that the partici-
pants should have known what the future held in store. Nobody can do that.
The most one can hope for is that policymakers and the public remain flexi-
ble and reappraise earlier decisions in light of new conditions. As citizens, we
must avoid a trap that historians frequently stumble into: we must not try to
impose a preconceived and simplistic pattern onto complex events.
Fred Adams
Drake University
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